After Vladimir Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the European Union was forced to confront a reality it had long avoided: its own defence readiness. For decades, Europe relied on diplomacy, economic interdependence, and American security guarantees.
But with the war grinding on, transatlantic trust fraying, and military warnings growing sharper, Brussels is racing to reinforce its military, industrial, and strategic foundations before time runs out.
The alarm has been amplified by blunt statements from Moscow and NATO. On 2 December, Putin declared Russia was ready to fight if necessary. Soon after, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte warned that Russia could target alliance territory within five years, while Germany’s defence minister Boris Pistorius cautioned that Europe may have seen its “last summer of peace.” In response, EU leaders approved a €90 billion loan package for Ukraine, and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen outlined plans to strengthen deterrence by 2030. The message from Europe’s security establishment is clear: the threat is no longer theoretical.
Public sentiment, however, is more hesitant. A Euronews poll found that 75% of nearly 10,000 respondents would not fight for the EU’s borders. Yet concern about Russian aggression is strongest in frontline states, with majorities in Poland, Lithuania, and Denmark ranking it among top threats. Across the continent, armed conflict now joins economic instability and energy security as a leading public anxiety, exposing a gap between political urgency and societal readiness.
Eastern European countries have responded most decisively. Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Finland, and Sweden are reviving civil defence planning, distributing emergency guides, conducting drills, and reinforcing borders. Sweden mailed updated crisis-preparedness brochures to households in 2025, while Poland expanded security education in schools. Online searches for shelters and evacuation advice have surged in states closest to Russia, reflecting a population increasingly alert to risk.
At EU level, the scale of mobilisation is unprecedented. Defence spending surpassed €300 billion in 2024, with €131 billion proposed for aerospace and defence in the 2028–2034 budget. The Readiness 2030 roadmap aims to move troops across borders within three days in peacetime and six hours in emergencies, supported by upgrades to roughly 500 bridges, tunnels, ports, and railways. The ReArm Europe initiative coordinates joint procurement through EDIP and the €150 billion SAFE loan facility, tackling fragmentation and boosting industrial capacity. Early demand is strong, with hundreds of projects already seeking funding.
Pressure from Washington has intensified the push. The 2025 U.S. strategy reaffirmed an “America First” stance and expects Europe to shoulder most of NATO’s conventional defence by 2027—an ambitious timeline. At the NATO summit in The Hague, allies pledged to aim for 5% of GDP in defence spending by 2035, though most remain below that level. EU figures including Valdis Dombrovskis, António Costa, and Kaja Kallas have pushed back against U.S. criticism, stressing strategic autonomy. Yet structural weaknesses—slow procurement, regulatory bottlenecks, and decades of underinvestment—remain formidable. Europe is no longer debating whether to act, but whether it can act fast enough.
