Public interest often spikes during geopolitical tension, especially regarding nuclear weapons. Historian Alex Wellerstein explains that in a “large-scale nuclear conflict, targets would not be chosen randomly or purely for dramatic effect.” Instead, they would be selected based on military doctrine, strategic value, and the attacker’s objectives. Analysts distinguish between counterforce targets—like missile silos and bomber bases—and countervalue targets, which focus on major population centers. Wellerstein emphasizes these exercises are “analytical, not predictions,” showing how nuclear strategy is structured. Mapping potential targets highlights deterrence: any attack would invite catastrophic retaliation.
Some smaller U.S. cities are prioritized for their military infrastructure. Great Falls is near Malmstrom Air Force Base, controlling intercontinental ballistic missiles. Cheyenne is linked to F.E. Warren Air Force Base, and Omaha hosts Offutt Air Force Base, headquarters of U.S. Strategic Command. Colorado Springs houses NORAD and U.S. Space Command. These locations gain strategic weight due to proximity to command systems, not population size. As Wellerstein notes, “infrastructure, not visibility, often determines priority in war-gaming scenarios.”
Strategic considerations also extend to the Pacific and West Coast. Honolulu, with Pearl Harbor and Indo-Pacific Command, plays a key role in Asia-Pacific defense. Seattle, San Francisco, and Los Angeles matter for economic, logistical, and symbolic reasons. Including such cities shows modern warfare planning considers “logistics hubs, industrial capacity, and global economic networks” alongside military installations.
Large metropolitan areas appear in countervalue discussions. Chicago, Houston, New York, and Washington, D.C., hold dense populations, economic power, and symbolic government authority. Nuclear doctrine weighs “leadership decapitation, economic paralysis, and psychological shock” to gauge escalation risk. Yet these discussions are meant to reinforce deterrence, not signal imminent strikes.
Wellerstein stresses that targeting depends on goals and conflict stage. First strikes focus on military assets; retaliation mirrors those priorities. Extreme doctrines consider infrastructure and population centers, but the overriding principle is deterrence. The continued avoidance of nuclear war relies on diplomacy, transparency, and the shared recognition that any large-scale exchange “would produce consequences so catastrophic that no nation could claim victory.”
